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In this paper, we revisit the association between happiness and inequality. We argue that the 
interaction between the perceived and the actual fairness of the income generation process 
affects this association. Building on a simple model of individual labor-market participation 
under uncertainty, we predict that higher levels of perceived fairness cause higher levels of 
utility, and lower preferred levels of income redistribution. In societies with a low level of 
actual social mobility, income inequality is perceived more negatively with increased 
perceived fairness, due to the need for unexpected policy changes as a response to many 
unsuccessful investments of overly optimistic individuals. This effect becomes smaller as 
actual social mobility increases. Using data on happiness and a broad set of fairness measures 
from the World Values Survey, we find strong support for the negative (positive) association 
between fairness perceptions and the demand for more equal incomes (subjective wellbeing). 
We also find strong empirical support for the disappointment effect in countries with low 
social mobility. Consistent with our theoretical model, the results for high-mobility countries 
turn out to be ambiguous. 
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Inequality is undoubtedly more readily borne, and 
affects the dignity of the person much less, if it is 
determined by impersonal forces than when it is 





Since Abba Lerner’s classic contributions from the 1930s, welfare economics has argued that 
income redistribution can increase overall welfare in a society with an unequal distribution of 
incomes, due to the decreasing returns to income caused by an assumed strict concavity of 
individual utility functions (Lerner, 1944). This view implies that most people in societies 
characterized by a highly skewed income distribution should, all other things being equal, be 
observed to experience lower levels of utility. With the advent of the economics of happiness, 
it  has  become  possible  –  and  fashionable  –  to  test  this  implication  on  individuals’  self-
reported  life  satisfaction, which  is  arguably  a reliable proxy  for the economic concept of 
‘utility’.
1 If  Lerner’s  implication – and  indeed  standard economic theory –  is  correct, we 
would  expect  to  see  a  clear  negative  association  between  income  inequality  and  life 
satisfaction of the average person. Such empirical results would be  in  line with the  more 
recent  theoretical  model  by  Fehr  and  Schmidt  (1999),  taking  account  of  social  (other-
regarding) preferences in individuals’ utility functions, equally predicting a negative relation 
between inequality and happiness.  
Even though this traditional, simple microeconomic approach predicts that overall and 
average welfare in an economy decrease with income inequality, the empirical literature on 
the association between income inequality and happiness
2 has yielded ambiguous findings.
3 
                                                 
1 For an overview of the economic, sociological and psychological concepts of subjective well-being and validity 
studies on its alternative measures, see Diener et al. (2008), Fischer (2009a), and Veenhoven (2000).  
2 In this paper, we use the terms ‘happiness’, ‘subjective well-being’, and ‘well-being’ interchangeably. 
3 In a related field of research Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008) and Layard, Mayraz and Nickell (2009), among 
others, use micro data to analyze income inequality effects through social comparisons where persons compare   3   
One of the first empirical contributions, Alesina et al. (2004), identify a negative association 
between income inequality and happiness for 12 European countries, but an association that is 
not  statistically  significant  for  most  U.S.  states.  Explaining  their  results,  the  authors 
hypothesize that differences in perceived and actual social mobility exist between these two 
continents. Extending the sample to 30 OECD countries, Fischer (2009b) reports a negative 
association between individual life satisfaction and inequality  in final income, but not for 
market-generated income inequality – potentially indicating that it is actual consumption on 
which social comparisons are based.
4 In a world sample, however, the large-scale robustness 
analysis in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008) suggests that the skewness of the income 
distribution does not, in general, affect individual happiness. 
In  this  paper,  we  investigate  the  relationship  between  inequality  and  happiness, 
extending  previous  research  in  two  dimensions:  First,  we  allow  individuals’  subjective 
perceptions of ‘fairness’ attributed to the income generating process to affect the association 
between life satisfaction and income inequality. In the words of Hopkins (2008), we aim at 
differentiating between reward inequality (possibly caused by an unfair income generating 
process even when endowments (skills) have been equal) and endowment inequality (which 
exists  prior  to  any  market  transaction,  and  is  shown  to  persist  even  when  the  income 
generating process  is  fair). Second, we allow  for differences  in the actual  fairness of the 
income  generation  process  across  countries,  expecting  that  these  affect  how  fairness 
perceptions  influence the  inequality-happiness-relation. Indeed, Grosfeld and Senik (2009) 
show that in the transition country Poland, at first, income inequality contributed positively to 
people’s happiness from 1992 to 1996, possibly because it was associated with given and 
perceived good economic opportunities. In contrast, in the later period from 1997 onwards, it 
affected  people’s  happiness  negatively,  possibly  because  lower  actual  social  mobility 
mismatched with what people still expected it to be. Alesina et al. (2004) already conjectured 
                                                                                                                                                   
their income with a reference level. In our study, inequality rather refers to differences in absolute income across 
persons and the presence of redistributive government activities. 
4 This is in line with Hopkins’ (2008) ‘rivalry model in conspicuous consumption’ according to which income 
inequality increases individual utility under certain conditions (high income and consumption levels, and a quite 
dense income distribution), as greater incentives to compete in consumption are generated.   4   
that inequality may affect people with specific values and specific views on social mobility in 
their societies differently, even if inequality in general is not associated with happiness.  
We present a stylized theoretical model, which serves to illustrate our main arguments 
and  allows  us  to  derive  some  testable  hypotheses.  This  model  analyzes  individual  labor-
market participation on the extensive and the intensive margin, depending on expected (i.e., 
perceived) fairness of the income-generating process. In the model, a society is considered 
fairer  the  closer  the  relationship  between  individual  effort  and  market outcome  is.  It  can 
therefore also be interpreted as a measure of social mobility, because with increasing fairness, 
inherited social status loses relevance. Our model allows systematic incongruences between 
actual and perceived fairness. The model predicts that persons with higher perceived fairness 
will – on average, but not in every single case – experience higher levels of utility and be less 
in favor of income redistribution.  
According to the model, it is the congruence of actual social mobility and individual 
fairness perceptions that determines how income inequality affects utility. In a country with 
high actual and perceived social mobility, individuals will invest more in human capital and 
thus, on average, realize more favorable economic outcomes – in terms of own income, but 
also concerning general economic growth. For a country that is a utopian, limiting case of 
perfect fairness, we expect that individuals with high fairness perceptions are not negatively 
affected by increased income inequality. The reason is that in this case, individuals can not 
overinvest into effort and there are no unexpected policy changes conditional on differences 
between the actual and the expected income distribution.  
In  contrast,  a  low-mobility  country,  characterized  by  institutions  impeding  social 
mobility, may suffer from the following problem: With actual social mobility being low, the 
group  of  individuals  who  overestimate  actual  fairness  tends  to  be  larger  relative  to  high 
mobility countries. This leads to a need for (ex ante) unexpected adjustments in fiscal policy, 
which in turn reduce utility for individuals who have invested and participate in the labor 
market and pay taxes. Ex post, higher perceived fairness in countries with low actual upward 
mobility  will  be  negatively  associated  with  income  inequality,  as  inequality  is  increased 
through increasing the number of transfer recipients and decreasing the number of taxpayers.    5   
To explore the link between perceptions of fairness, social mobility, inequality, and 
happiness empirically we use data from the World Values Survey 1997-2001 and estimate a 
happiness function. We employ Gini coefficients to measure income inequality, four different 
proxies  for  individuals’  perceived  fairness  of  the  income  generating  process,  and  the 
interaction of inequality with these proxies. We employ measures of institutional quality to 
approximate actual social mobility. The empirical analysis aims to explore whether and to 
what  extent  perceived  fairness  mediates  the  potential  effects  of  inequality,  differentiating 
between countries with low and high actual social mobility. We also investigate the relation 
between  fairness  perceptions  and  the  demand  for  redistribution,  mediating  the  impact  of 
fairness on life satisfaction. 
We find that persons who believe the income generating process in their society to be 
fair appear to be happier and demand less income equalization (and redistribution) by the 
government. As predicted by the model, we also find strong empirical support for the negative 
effect  of  inequality  for  individuals  with  high  fairness  perceptions  in  countries  with 
unfavorable institutions hampering social mobility. Consistent with our model, for countries 
where  institutions  facilitate  equal  investment  opportunities  and  access  to  markets  –  thus 
triggering a close relationship between individual effort and market outcomes – the effects of 
income inequality and fairness perceptions appear rather disentangled in their interactions. 
The  interaction  results  are  corroborated  in  smaller  samples  based  on  measures  of  actual 
mobility through the education system. 
Section 2 presents a literature review, and our stylized theoretical model motivating 
the empirical analysis. From the model we then derive testable hypotheses. Data and methods 
are described in Section 3, while Section 4 presents the results. The final section concludes 





   6   
2. Happiness, inequality and fairness: Theory 
 
2.1. Preliminary considerations and the literature 
In 1944, Austrian economist and social philosopher Friedrich Hayek (1944: 88) argued that 
“To produce the same results for different people, it is necessary to treat them differently. To 
give different people the same objective opportunities is not to give them the same subjective 
chances.” From this follows, as Hayek suggested, that forcing individuals’ outcomes to be 
identical  and  ‘fair’  implies  treating  people  unequally,  and,  thus,  ‘unfairly’.  The  relation 
between what could be termed ‘fairness’ or other moral judgments of processes and outcomes 
and social inequality is therefore far from simple and straightforward. 
The treatment of ‘utility’ in the economics literature, both by the empirical research on 
happiness as well as standard economic theory, has usually focused on pure outcomes and 
neglected social comparisons. Yet, individuals do not only derive satisfaction from outcomes, 
but probably compare themselves to others, and also enjoy ‘procedural utility’ (Veblen 1899, 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Frey and Stutzer, 2005). If people gain the impression that processes 
affecting their own situation are ‘fair’, they are not only likely to directly derive procedural 
utility from that fact, but also tend to evaluate the outcomes of these processes differently than 
if their subjective perception of the process is that it is ‘unfair’. For example, most people 
strongly dislike losing games or sports matches, but the impact of a loss is much stronger if 
they have the – reasonable or unreasonable – impression that their opponent has not played by 
the rules. Similarly, Stutzer and Frey (2003) show that two-thirds of the beneficial effects of 
people’s  influence  in the political decision-making process  is  not through their  impact on 
resulting policy outcomes, but through the procedural utility gained from participation and 
civic engagement. Experimental evidence tends to support Hayek’s broad argument: Recent 
economic experiments reveal that inequality in profits is the more tolerated (by otherwise 
generally  inequity-averse  individuals)  the  more  the  process  leading  to  its  generation  was 
perceived as ‘fair’. Experimental research has even identified the corresponding neurological 
process in the reward center of the human brain (see Hopkins, 2008, for a summary).    7   
To sum up, economic experiments show that if the process of reaching an outcome has 
been fair, then subjects in general bear an adverse outcome more easily. In contrast to our 
study, the set-up of these experiments is fairly simple, allowing actual fairness of the process 
and  perceived  fairness  of  the  distribution  process  to  coincide.  However,  one  decisive 
contribution of our paper is to draw conclusions differentiating between actual and perceived 
fairness, which may or may not overlap, reflecting more complex real-world characteristics, 
which do not allow individuals to objectively observe actual social mobility in their societies.
5 
These  theoretical  and  experimental  arguments  can  be  applied  to  individuals’ 
evaluations  of  the  distribution  of  income  in  society.  Their  subjective  evaluation  of  the 
outcome – the inequality of incomes – is likely to depend on their perceptions of the processes 
creating  the  distribution  and  their  evaluations  of  the  fairness  of  those  processes.  Such  a 
conjecture has already been made by Alesina et al. (2004) to explain the differential effect of 
income inequality on happiness of survey respondents in the United States compared to those 
in Western Europe. For a sample of 30 OECD countries in the WVS, Fischer (2009b) finds 
that in a socially mobile society (from the interviewees’ points of view) the negative effect of 
income inequality on well-being is mitigated, if not overcompensated. Likewise, in economic 
laboratory  experiments  Mitchell  et  al.  (1993:  636)  find  that  “inequality  becomes  more 
acceptable as people are better rewarded for their efforts,” which can be interpreted as an 
indication for a mediating effect of the fairness of the distribution process of ‘rewards’, i.e., 
wage incomes, on the relationship between inequality and happiness.  
In this paper, we define an income generating process as ‘fair’ if there is a direct link 
between  own  investment  in  human  capital,  on-the-job  effort  and  individual  economic 
outcome. The  looser this  link  becomes,  i.e., the  more the  individual outcome depends on 
chance, the less fair the income generating process is. This would also be the case if income 
differences were caused mainly by individual differences in innate talent or ability that cannot 
be compensated by effort. Such initial endowments could also include inherited wealth. On 
the  other  hand,  if  individuals’  perceptions  of  society  indicate  that  ‘someone’  –  either 
individually or collectively (e.g., through political decision-making) – is responsible for the 
                                                 
5 Indeed, our model suggests that if perceived fairness is high and actual fairness has a corresponding level, the 
positive effect of inequality on subjective well-being rises with perceived fairness.    8   
shape of the income distribution, moral judgments on fairness will arguably come to rest on a 
different foundation. 
Actual (objective) and perceived (subjective) fairness in the income generation process 
is often not clearly distinguished by the early theoretical and empirical literature on happiness 
or preferences for redistribution. Most studies implicitly – Alesina et al. (2004) even explicitly 
– assume that subjectively perceived and objectively existing fairness in society correspond 
perfectly.  However,  the  empirical  happiness  analysis  for  30  OECD  countries  by  Fischer 
(2009b)  suggests  that  perceived  and  actual  social  mobility  in  society  are  not  necessarily 
strongly correlated. For this reason, we explicitly differentiate between actual and perceived 
fairness and put them in a systematic relation. In particular, we hypothesize that whether the 
happiness effects of income inequality are aggravated or reduced by fairness perceptions for 
most of the population hinges on whether their perceived and the actual fairness coincide or 
diverge.  
Fairness perceptions can also be argued to diverge according to political convictions: 
Left-wing parties place more weight on equity of outcomes (so-called ‘social justice’), while 
right-wing governments place  more weight on efficiency and equality  in opportunities, as 
voters’  definitions  of  fairness  differ  systematically  across  parties  (Scott  et  al.  2001). 
Fundamental differences in fairness perceptions would thus suggest that left-wing voters are 
sensitive  mainly to income  inequality,  but  less to procedural  fairness as a determinant of 
market income (see also the empirical test in Fischer 2009b). In contrast, right-wing voters 
have  offsetting  efficiency  concerns,  which  lead  them  to  focus  more  on  equality  of 
opportunities, and to accept the resulting income inequality more easily. In a conservative 
perspective, relatively large income differences might be seen as an indication that individuals 
who work hard receive their just deserts. Indeed, Alesina et al. (2004) find that left-wing 
voters are more concerned about income inequality than right-wing or centrist voters, both in 
Europe and the United States We therefore employ the respondent’s political ideology as one 
proxy of her fairness perception. 
In  the  course  of  this  analysis,  we  predict  a  negative  relation  between  fairness 
perceptions and the demand for income redistribution, which we also test against our data.   9   
The relation between social mobility (perceptions) and the preference for equal incomes has 
been analyzed in a couple of previous studies. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), using Russian 
micro data, were the first to show that self-assessed expected own social mobility, or the belief 
of being on a rising income trajectory, leads to lower demand for redistribution. Corneo and 
Gruener (2002) present a ‘public values effect’ model, concluding that “an individual who 
believes  in  the  importance  of  personal  hard  work  [for  income]  is  expected  to  oppose 
redistribution”  (ibidem:  86),  preceding  the  similar  arguments  in  Alesina  et  al.  (2004).  In 
Corneo  and  Gruener’s  (2002)  logit  regressions,  run  with  about  30  countries  in  various 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) waves on the question ‘Government should 
reduce inequality’, both generalized fairness perceptions and perceived past social mobility 
reduce the demand for equalizing incomes.
6 In contrast, persons reporting that ‘they would 
gain [from redistribution]’ are in favor of such government policy. Population preferences for 
and against redistribution are captured by country  fixed effects, an approach that we will 
follow below. A negative relation between personal income and preferences for redistribution 
is not only shown in Corneo and Gruener (2002), but also by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). 
Using U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) data, the  latter corroborate the negative relation 
between perceived equal opportunities, subjective income prospects, income, and a history of 
past social mobility, with a preference for income redistribution.
7 Exploiting the longitudinal 
nature of their panel data, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) construct two objective measures of 
actual  income  prospects,  at the  individual  and  state  level.  They  find  both  to  be  strongly 
negatively  related  to  individual  demand  for  more  equal  incomes.  Contrasting  results  are 
reported in Clark and D’Angelo (2008) for the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) who 
identify  a  positive  association  between  own  experienced  social  mobility  (‘having  higher 
                                                 
6 Fairness perceptions are measured by the question ‘hard work is the key [to success]’, while social mobility 
experience is captured by the variable ‘better off than father’.  
7  Preference  for  redistribution  is  measured  by  the  question  ‘Should  government  reduce  income  difference 
between rich and poor?’. Past history  of social mobility is measured by ‘having a job prestige higher than 
father’s’, and subjective income prospects are proxied by ‘expect a better life’. Equal opportunities as source of 
economic success are approximated by the question ‘Get ahead: hard work’, while unequal opportunities are 
approximated with the statement ‘Get ahead: luck/help’.   10   
socio-economic status than parents’) and being in favor of having capped incomes, or state-
ownership, and being left-wing.
8  
In  the  following,  we  develop  a  simple  workhorse  model,  illustrating  the  potential 
impact of income inequality and fairness perceptions on individual well-being. 
 
 
2.2. The basic set-up of the model 
Following,  among  others,  Blanchflower  and  Oswald  (2004),  we  assume  that  reported 
subjective  well-being  or  ‘happiness’  of  an  individual  i  is  an  increasing  function  of  her 
instantaneous, directly unobservable utility where i is an error-term:  
 
(1)  Wi  w(ui)i 
 
The error term reflects unobservable differences across individuals, such as different 
subjective interpretations of the ordinal scale on which individual well-being is reported. This 
assumption allows us to focus on standard economic utility considerations in the theoretical 
analysis, i.e., on the underlying economic forces that influence individual welfare.  
We assume, without loss of generality, that utility is linear in income  yi and that effort 
invested to earn income has a negative and quadratic direct effect on utility. 
 








(3)  yi  g(ei) 1 1  1i    . 
 
                                                 
8 This study employs the measure ‘The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money that any 
one person can make’, which is not fully comparable to that used in previous empirical analyses.    11   
Income  increases  with  effort  according  to  the  strictly  concave  function  g.  The 
parameter    [0,1] is a society-wide fairness parameter. The closer its value is to one, the 
more  reliable  is  the  impact  of  individual  effort  on  individual  income.  The  value  of  this 
parameter is identical for all individuals. On the other hand,  i  [0,1] is an idiosyncratic 
parameter  reflecting,  for  example,  the  family  background  or  the  place  of  birth  of  an 
individual. In general, i captures anything in the personal background of an individual that 
may make it more difficult for her to earn an income based upon her own effort.  
We assume that the true value of   is unknown to the individual decision-makers. 
They can certainly observe the institutional framework of their society, but the web of formal 
and informal institutions that characterizes any modern society is generally complex enough 
to  make  any  exact  ex  ante  knowledge  of  the  true  value  of    extremely  unlikely.  Every 
individual therefore bases her decisions on her own estimate  ˜   i.
9 The idiosyncratic parameter 
i is assumed to be determined randomly. It is drawn from an individual-specific distribution 
characterized by the continuous and unimodal pdf fi(i) with support  0,1  . Let  ˆ   i denote the 
expected value of the idiosyncratic parameter for individual i. We assume that the distribution 
of  ˆ   i over the population is skewed to the right, and also unimodal. We further assume that 
their own  ˆ   i is known to all individuals. They do, however, not observe the value of i that is 
eventually drawn. They only observe income and effort, but have no definitive knowledge 
about how much of the result is due to bad (good) institutions, or an (un-)lucky draw of the 
idiosyncratic parameter. Furthermore, we assume that  ˆ   i is inherited: Individuals from poorer 
families or worse neighborhoods are characterized by lower values of  ˆ   i.
10 However, even 
individuals from unfavorable backgrounds have a chance to draw a favorable high i from the 
distribution.  
                                                 
9 Piketty (1995) has shown in a model where individual income is also determined by societal fairness and 
individual influences that differences in fairness estimations may prevail in an equilibrium with full Bayesian 
rationality. 
10 Note that there is emphatically no genetic inheritance assumed to be at work here. This approach simply 
captures the empirical regularity that individuals from low-income families often find it more difficult to rise into 
high-paying  positions  than  those  who  already  have  a  high-income  background.  In  a  utopian  situation  with 
completely  fair  institutions  ( 1),  the  impact  of  the  idiosyncratic  parameter  would  be  cancelled  out 
completely.   12   

















which straightforwardly leads to the simple first order condition 
 
(5)  g'(ei) 1 1 ˜   i  1 ˆ   i    ei. 
 
 
2.3. Expected and actual utility, effort and reported happiness 
From (5), we can  infer  individually optimal effort levels  as  functions of the other  model 
parameters: 
 
(6)   ei
*  ei
* ˜   i, ˆ   i     with   ei˜  
* 0  and  e
i ˆ  
*  0. 
 
Clearly, for all individuals who believe initially that  ˜   i  , a marginal increase of  ˜   i 
is associated with an increase in expected, as well as realized utility. If (1) is stable in time, an 
increase in perceived fairness in time is associated with an unambiguous increase in reported 
happiness. Similarly, if (1) is sufficiently similar for all persons, then among individuals with 
˜   i  , persons with a higher perceived fairness will unambiguously report higher levels of 
happiness.  For  individuals  with  ˜   i  ,  things  are  more  complicated.  While  subjectively 
expected utility increases with  ˜   i, realized utility does not. Ex post, individuals tend to find 
out that they have overinvested into effort, and the magnitude of overinvestment (and the 
associated loss of utility) increases with  ˜   i.  The overall effect of ex ante fairness perceptions 
on  instantaneous  utility  is  therefore  ambiguous.  It  is  also  likely  to  be  non-linear,  i.e.,  a 
positive effect can be expected for relatively low starting levels of perceived fairness, while a   13   
negative marginal effect is more likely to prevail with starting levels of perceived fairness that 
already are very high. 
With effort determined and income revealed, it is easy for any individual to calculate 
her value of  1i  1i   ex post, but individual knowledge is not sufficient to disentangle 
these two effects. Deriving an indirect utility function V from (2) and using the envelope 
theorem reveals that  V ˜  i  g(ei
*)(1 ˆ   i), i.e., expected utility is linear and increasing in  ˜   i. 
However, to any value of  ˜   i corresponds a range of actually realized individual utility levels 
in the population, each depending on the individually drawn values, i. How will i respond if 
i  ui(,i)Vi( ˜   i, ˆ   i) 0?  If  i 0,  it  is  reasonable  (although  not  necessary  for  our 
argument) to assume that the individual will claim the laurels for herself, believe in having 
drawn i  ˆ   i and leave her  ˜   i unchanged. If i 0, the opposite reaction is likely:  ˜   i will be 
revised downward towards  ˆ   i  ˜   i for which  ui(,i) Vi( ˆ   i, ˆ   i). For all observations that 
initially  lie  below the  Vi-line,  individuals adjust their  fairness perceptions such that these 
observations eventually lie exactly on this upward-sloping line. This leads us to  
 
Proposition 1. If individuals shift the responsibility for a negative difference between actual 
and  expected  utility  to  the  institutional  framework  by  revising  their  fairness  perceptions 
downward, then an overall positive relationship between perceived fairness and self-reported 
well-being is expected in populations of individuals that are heterogeneous with respect to 
their marginal ability to earn incomes. 
 
 
2.4. Preferences for income redistribution and reported happiness 
Let there be a simple, redistributive tax and transfer system, which consists of a proportional 
income tax with rate t levied on labor income, and of a guaranteed transfer income  yT(t) paid 
to those individuals who do not earn a market income. To keep matters simple, we assume 
that  government  commands  no  screening  technology  that  would  allow  it  to  distinguish   14   
between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. Individuals therefore compare expected 
utilities on and off the labor market, and participate only if  
 
(7)  (1 t) g(ei




*  yT(t). 
 
Thus,  for  any  given  tax  and  transfer  system  t,yT(t)    in  combination  with  an 
individual belief  ˜   i, there exists some threshold value i
T where (7) holds with equality and 
where  for  any  ˆ   i i
T the  individual  decides  in  favor of  labor  market  participation.  Since 
procedural fairness compensates for an unfavorable idiosyncratic parameter value, the value 
of the threshold i
Tis strictly declining in perceived fairness. In other words, higher perceived 
fairness yields higher planned (ex ante) labor market participation rates even in groups who 
expect relatively lower values of i. With utility being linear in income, the insurance motive 
for  redistribution  does  not  play  a  role.  Redistribution  is  ex  ante  only  in  the  interest  of 
individuals who plan not to participate in the labor market.  
The  relationship  between  preferences  for  redistribution  and  fairness  perceptions  is 
reinforced if we also allow for ex post adjustments of fairness perceptions as discussed above. 
Suppose the redistribution scheme is extended such that individuals who participate, but earn 
a surprisingly low income, are paid a transfer until they reach a net income of  yT. Those 
benefiting from such a scheme would all be individuals with i 0, who revise their fairness 
perceptions downward ex post. In other words, all transfer-recipients are characterized by low 
fairness  perceptions:  Either  because  they  already  had  them  ex  ante,  and  decided  not  to 
participate in the labor market, or because they were disappointed by their individual market 
outcome and accordingly revised their fairness perception downwards ex post. This revision 
leads to an ex post fairness perception which lies below the ex ante threshold for labor market 
participation.  However,  any  investments  into  effort  are  obviously  sunk  and  cannot  be 
retrieved. Thus follows 
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Proposition 2. An individual randomly drawn from the population is the more likely to report 
a  preference  for  increased  redistribution  the  lower  her  individual  fairness  perception  is. 
Therefore, a stronger preference for redistribution is also expected to be positively correlated 
with less self-reported happiness. 
 
 
2.5. Fairness, inequality and self-reported happiness 
Our model contains different mechanisms that yield income inequality. The ex post market 
income of individual i is 
 
(8)  yi
*  g ei
*( ˜   i,ˆ   i)  1 1  1i    . 
 
First of all, income inequality generally stems from the idiosyncratic parameter. The 
larger the variance of i in the population, the larger the inequality of incomes ceteris paribus 
will be. This will normally also imply a large variance of  ˆ   i, and thus of individually chosen 
effort levels. Similarly, a larger variance of individual beliefs  ˜   i also eventually results in 
larger  income  inequality,  through  the  establishment  of  a  larger  variety  in  the  individual 
choices of effort levels. 
Without developing a fully-fledged political economy model, and treating the political 
process as a black box, suppose government announces a tax and transfer system  t,yT(t)  ex 
ante. Suppose further that the transfer is fixed after being announced and that, if ex post more 
or less individuals than expected have a right to receive transfers, the tax rate will be adjusted 
to balance the budget. The government is fully informed about all  ˆ   i, but not about other 
moments of  fi(i), and neither are the individuals themselves. The government is informed 
about  the  distribution  of  ˜   i  in  the  population.  Given  this  distribution  of  information, 
individuals are therefore not able to calculate a more precise estimate of the budget-balancing 
tax rate than their government.    16   
Suppose at first that we are analyzing a high-fairness economy, i.e., one characterized 
by a high value of the actual fairness parameter, ideally by a value close to unity. With  1 
the influence of the idiosyncratic parameter diminishes and eventually disappears. Inequality 
in incomes and utility exists and may be large, depending on the shape of the distribution of 
˜   i, but it follows from variance in ex ante fairness perceptions, and thus differing individually 
chosen effort levels. More importantly, the number of individuals who participate in the labor 
market and unexpectedly earn an income  yi
*  yT also tends towards zero with   1. The 
reason is again that the impact of the idiosyncratic parameter disappears. The government's 
initial  estimate  of  the  budget-balancing  tax  rate  becomes  more  precise,  and  ex  post  tax 
increases become more unlikely, and smaller if they occur. 
Suppose  now  that,  under  the  same  set  of  assumptions,  a  low-fairness  economy  is 
analyzed. With   0, the impact of the idiosyncratic parameter becomes less mediated by 
fairness of institutions. Even individuals with high values of  ˆ   i are at risk to become transfer 
recipients if they draw a low actual i. The estimate of the budget-balancing tax rate becomes 
less precise; ex post tax increases become more likely and, if they occur, larger with a decline 
in the value of the actual fairness parameter. Individuals adjust their fairness perception in the 
same  fashion as discussed  in Section 2.4., taking account of their  market  incomes. Thus, 
Proposition 1 still holds. However, the unexpected tax increase is a disutility to all individuals 
who (i) decided to participate in the labor market, and (ii) earned an income  yi
*  yT. On the 
other hand, individuals who (i) participate in the labor market and (ii) unexpectedly earn an 
income  yi
*  yT due to a low value of  i earn a lower income with the same effort level, 
relative  to  the  high-fairness  economy.  In  the  low-fairness  economy,  individuals  with  a 
fairness perception high enough to induce labor market participation thus suffer from lower 
utility levels than in a high-fairness economy, either due to a lower market income, or due to 
the impact of unexpected taxes.  
Finally,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  increases  in  income  inequality  are  associated  with 
increases in unexpected taxes. The more individuals unexpectedly fall to incomes  yi
*  yT, the 
higher the tax increase is for those who remain above the  yT. The effect described above thus 
increases in magnitude with increasing inequality.    17   
 
Proposition  3.  For  individuals  with  fairness  perceptions  and  mobility  expectations  ˜   i 
sufficiently high to induce labor market participation and living in economies with low levels 
of actual social mobility , a negative effect of income inequality on instantaneous utility and 
self-reported well-being is expected. With actual social mobility approaching its maximum, 




3. Data and Method 
 
3.1. Data 
In order to empirically test Propositions 1 to 3, we employ data from the pooled third and 
fourth waves of the World Values Survey, covering the years 1994-2001 (Inglehart et al., 
2004).  The  availability  of  reliable  and  internationally  comparable  Gini  data  restricts  our 
choice  of  WVS  data  to  around  the  year  1995.  We  follow  the  standard  approach  in  the 
literature by using individuals’ responses to the question “All things considered, how satisfied 
are you with your life as a whole these days?" as proxy for (remembered) utility and the 
dependent variable for Propositions 1 and 3. The responses are distributed on a ten-point scale 
ranging from 1 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied), with a sample mean of 
about 6.3.
11 In order to estimate a set of relevant personal characteristics forming the core of 
individuals’ happiness functions, we rely on the robust baseline model in Bjørnskov, Dreher 
and  Fischer  (2008)  and  Fischer  (2009c).  The  country-level  control  variables  include  only 
country fixed effects, to avoid biasing the impact of the inequality measure through the choice 
of macro-controls. At the individual level, we include measures of age, gender, family type, 
religion, religiosity and spirituality. The baseline model is complemented with a wave dummy 
                                                 
11 The WVS includes questions on both life satisfaction and happiness, but the correlation between happiness 
and  satisfaction  is  surprisingly  low  (rho  =  0.44).  We  opt  for  using  the  life  satisfaction  question  since  1) 
translation problems seem to yield cross-country comparisons of answers to the other question less comparable 
and 2) the happiness question is more likely to capture the affective component of subjective well-being rather 
than its cognitive component (for a discussion, see Fischer 2009a).   18   
and age cohort effects. The empirical models exclude measures of education, income and 
occupational  status  that,  according  to  the  theoretical  model,  should  fully  mediate  an 
individual’s  subjective  success  probability  ˜   i  (fairness  perception).  They  are,  however, 
included in additional tests further below. 
  Measures of vertical and horizontal trust (such as confidence in political institutions 
and trust in other people) do not form part of the baseline model as they may be strongly 
correlated with perceived fairness and could thus be transmission channels for our variable of 
main  interest.
12 Due to data availability, the  baseline sample  is reduced to approximately 
146,000 respondents from 68 countries; depending on the employed fairness measure, it may 
even be reduced further. The baseline results for the micro-level determinants of subjective 
well-being (SWB) in the present sample are similar to those in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer 
(2008) – they are reported in Column 1 of Table  A1  in  Appendix  A, while  Appendix B 
presents descriptive statistics.
13   
 
Measures of self-report procedural fairness and demand for income redistribution 
Individuals’ fairness evaluations of income inequality are approximated using definitions of 
fairness in the income generation process in the labor market. They include measures of social 
mobility in the labor market, such as, e.g., whether hard work determines economic success. 
All fairness perception proxies are constructed as dichotomous variables, taking on the value 
‘1’  if  the  respondent  believes  that  procedural  fairness  is  present  in  society,  and  ‘0’  if 
otherwise. These definitions of  fairness perceptions  have  also been employed  in previous 
studies such as Corneo and Gruener (2002) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). In addition, 
we approximate fairness perceptions by employing information on individual political self-
positioning on a leftist-conservative scale, arguing that conservative persons favor fairness in 
the  income  generation  process,  while  leftist  oriented  persons  are  more  outcome-oriented. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the fairness perception measures included in this study. 
 
                                                 
12 Note that the inclusion of a measure of horizontal trust does not alter the main results of our analysis (e.g., in 
Tables 6 and 7), but does reduce the size of the regression samples by between 3000 and 6000 observations. 
13 For a detailed discussion of these results see Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008).   19   
Table 1: Measures of fairness perceptions and income redistribution 
 
Variable name  Definition 
Fairness in the education system and the labor market 
Hard work  Dummy  that  is  ‘one’  for  values  below  5  on  the 
question ‘In the long run, hard work usually brings 
success’ (which has a 10-point scale) 
Laziness   Dummy that is ‘one’ for individuals claiming ‘People 
are  living  in  need  because  of  laziness  or  lack  of 
willpower’  and  ‘zero’  when  answering  ‘People  are 
living in need because of injustice in society’ 
Chance  Dummy  that  is  ‘one’  for  individuals  claiming  that 
‘people  have  a  chance  to  escape  poverty’. 
(alternative: ‘they have little chance’) 
 
General meritocratic worldview  
Conservative  Dummy that is ‘one’ for values above or equal to 7 
on a 10-point scale measuring conservative political 
ideology 
   
Demand for income redistribution 
More equal  
incomes 
Dummy  that  is  ‘one’  for  values  below  5  on  the 
question “Incomes should be more equal” (which has 
a 10-point scale) 
Elimination  Dummy that is ‘one’ for values 1 and 2 on a 5-point 
scale  measuring  the  ‘importance  of  eliminating  big 
income inequalities’ (ranging from ‘very important’ 
to ‘not at all important’). 
Basic needs  Dummy that is ‘one’ for values 1 and 2 on a 5-point 
scale  measuring  the  ‘importance  to  guaranteeing 




  The demand for income redistribution is measured using three proxies derived from the 
World Values Survey. These variables, originally recorded on a 10-point or, respectively, a 5-
point scale, were aggregated into dichotomous indicators (‘1’ = pro redistribution) in order to 
facilitate the empirical analysis in the probit models and, particularly, the interpretation of the 
results. They resemble the measures of income redistribution through governments employed   20   
in  Corneo  and  Gruener  (2002)  and  Alesina  and  La  Ferrara  (2005).  Table  1  provides  on 
overview of the variables employed and their exact codings. 
 
Measures of actual social mobility 
To test Proposition 3, perceived social mobility (perceived fairness/equal opportunities) needs 
to be distinguished from actual social mobility. Unfortunately, cross-nationally comparable 
social mobility measures are hardly available on a large scale. To exploit the large sample size 
of up to 68 countries, we suggest using several proxies of actual social mobility. First, we 
employ the Gastil  index of civil  liberties (Freedom House 2007) and the Fraser Index of 
Economic Freedom (Gwartney and Lawson 2008). Second, following Fischer (2009b), we 
employ  measures  of  intergenerational  mobility  in  terms  of  educational  attainment,  in 
particular  whether  student  performance  depends  on  parental  background.  These  direct 
measures of social mobility are, however, only available for a small subsample of OECD 
countries.  
The  rationale  for  using  indices  of  economic  freedom  is  that  social  mobility  is  only 
possible in an institutional framework that allows for free choice of occupation in a liberalized 
labor market, easy access to the national credit market (all measured by area 5 of the Fraser 
index, ranging from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest)), a government size not too large, triggering 
modest taxation of capital and income (captured by area 1), and a sound monetary policy that 
does not hamper investment (area 3). In addition, legal quality and the protection of property 
rights (area 2) as well as openness to the international goods markets and access to foreign 
capital  (area  4)  may  equally  be  prerequisites  for  a  socially  mobile  society  and  actual 
procedural  fairness  in  the  income  generation  process.  Similarly,  the  Gastil  index  of  civil 
liberties  (range:  1  (highest)  to  7  (lowest))  captures  not  only  freedoms  of  expression  and 
religion, but also the economically important dimensions of freedom of assembly, association 
(such as unions and firm cartels), and equal opportunities in education.  
To test for the robustness of our results, we employ measures of actual social mobility. 
We use a  measure of educational  mobility  based on the PISA 2003 Mathematics results, 
obtained  from  Fischer  (2009b)  and  available  for  27  countries  in  our  baseline  sample.   21   
Educational mobility is the average advantage of having a high-education family background, 
expressed  in test score points. More specifically, it  is the average difference  between the 
performance of students with such an advantageous family background compared to average 
student performance. The closer this difference is to zero, the more independent is student 
performance from parental background, and the more socially mobile is a country’s education 
system. Appendix C presents the values of these actual social mobility measures for OECD 
countries.  
 
Measure of income inequality 
The Gini coefficients  for testing Proposition 3 are obtained  from UNU (2006) and relate 
roughly to the  year 1995.
14  We  have chosen to obtain the Gini  values  from this specific 
database  because  the  authors  undertook  special  care  to  use  reliable,  high-quality  income 
information to calculate the Gini coefficients to ensure its cross-country comparability; non-
comparability  of  Gini  coefficients  across  countries  constitutes  a  severe  problem  with 
alternative  income  inequality  information  (e.g.,  from  the  World  Development  Indicators 
database).  As  the  Gini  measure  refers  to  a  cross-section  of  countries  only,  its  true  effect 
cannot  be  identified  due  to  its  multicollinearity  with  the  country  fixed  effects.  However, 
Proposition 3 can be tested by interacting our fairness measures with the Gini coefficient. 




Proposition  1  predicts  a  positive  association  of  individual  fairness  perceptions  ( ˜   i  = 
perceived fairness of individual i) with individual life satisfaction. For testing Proposition 1, 
we simply add the four fairness perception measures to the baseline happiness model and 
observe  their  relations  with  subjective  well-being  (SWBi  =  f(fairnessi,  ...)).  Vector 
                                                 
14  Gini  coefficients  all  are  calculated  on  the  basis  of  gross  income  or  earnings  and  are  thus  prior  to  any 
redistribution. However, Bergh (2005) shows for 11 OECD countries with high quality national statistics systems 
that the difference between pre-transfer and post-transfer Gini coefficients is not a reliable measure of actual 
government redistribution.    22   
includes theindividual-level control variables, country fixed effects, a wave dummy and 
cohort effects, as described above. According to the theoretical model, in equilibrium, the 
effects  of  fairness  perceptions  should  entirely  run  through  own  income,  education  and 
occupational  status,  which  we  therefore  exclude  from  the  vector    of  the  baseline 
specification.  We  test  whether  these  variables  are  transmission  channels  for  our  main 
variables of interest and therefore also report specifications including them.  
 
(9)  SWBi = 'fairnessi +'+ ui 
 
Proposition  2  predicts  that  perceiving  the  income  generation  process  as  fair  lowers  the 
demand for income redistribution, while demanding more redistribution itself is predicted to 
be  negatively  associated  with  subjective  well-being.  In  other  words,  Proposition  2  views 
equation (9) as a reduced function of the chained function (SWBi = f (REDi (fairnessi ...) …). 
We test this hypothesis by, first, estimating a model of demand for income redistribution, with 
the identical variable of interest and the same set of control variables as in equation (9). The 
estimated coefficient ' indicates the effect of fairness perceptions on the probability to be in 
favor of redistribution: 
 
(10)  Pr(RED)i= 'fairnessi '+ ui 
 
In a second step, we relate subjective well-being to the demand for redistribution, expecting a 
negative relation: 
 
(11)  SWBi = REDi '+ ui 
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To  test  Proposition  3,  we  add  the  interactions  of  the  responses  to  one  of  those  fairness 
perception questions with income inequality in their home country as measured by the Gini 
coefficient to equation (9).
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(12)  SWBi = fairnessi + fairnessiGINI '+ u 
 
In estimating the model of subjective well-being we follow the previous literature (see, e.g., 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer 2008), but employ OLS in which coefficient estimates also 
represent  marginal  effects,  facilitating  the  interpretation  of  the  interaction  terms.  This 
approach follows Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), who show that OLS is a feasible 
estimation  procedure  for  a  10-point  categorical  happiness  variable  by  employing  the  10-
category  life  satisfaction  question  in  the  German  Socio-Economic  Panel,  the  analogue  of 
which we have obtained from the WVS.  
Given the dichotomous nature of the measures of preference for income redistribution, 
the model of redistributive preferences is estimated as probit model, which greatly facilitates 
the calculation of the marginal effects (for the probability of reporting a pro-redistributive 
political  statement).  Even  though  the  analysis  focuses  on  the  direction  of  (significant) 
influences of the  fairness perceptions estimates, we also discuss their relative quantitative 
effects. 
The next section reports the results. 
 
                                                 
15  A  potential  worry  with  these  data  would  arise  if  they  simply  proxied  for  individuals’  income  positions. 
However, the responses are only weakly associated with individual incomes.   24   
4. Results 
 
4.1. Some basic correlations 
Prior to turning to the multivariate analysis it may be worthwhile to investigate a couple of 
simple correlations between individual life satisfaction and perceived and objective fairness, 
or, respectively, social mobility.   
  Simple  correlations  between  measures  of  fairness  perceptions  and  individual  life 
satisfaction are rather low or moderate, with coefficient values ranging between roughly 0.05 
(hard work) and 0.2 (chance to escape poverty). Correlations with measures of actual social 
mobility are somewhat larger, for civil liberties (Gastil) and economic freedom (full Fraser 
index), between 0.23 and 0.26 (in absolute terms). For the subsample of OECD countries, 
measures of social mobility in terms of educational attainment show correlations similar in 
size to that of economic  freedom, with coefficients  for  maternal and paternal  educational 
dependence of 0.20 and 0.22, respectively. Finally, the correlation between income inequality 
and life satisfaction is positive, but fairly small (0.06).  
  In general, correlations of roughly 0.4 to 0.6 are achieved when an aggregate measure 
of happiness is employed in place of individual subjective well-being. Using the mean of life 
satisfaction in a country, economic freedom shows a correlation of about 0.5 to 0.6, and social 
mobility  in  education  of  about  0.6  –  0.7.  Only  the  Gini  coefficients  still  show  a  small 
correlation  of  0.14  with  country  means  in  life  satisfaction,  possibly  indicating  their 
subsample-specific heterogeneous effect. Employing aggregated individual data on the four 
fairness perceptions measures, correlations with country means in life satisfaction range from 
0.06 to 0.4 and are, for at least two measures (poverty due to laziness and chance to escape 
poverty), quite  large.  
 
 
4.2. Testing Proposition 1: Fairness perceptions and subjective well-being 
Table 2 tests Proposition 1 by including the proxies for perceived fairness to the baseline 
specification  of  the  well-being  model,  one-by-one.  Overall,  Table  2  tests  four  fairness   25   
measures, yielding four model variants. The table displays only the estimation results for the 
fairness measure and the number of individual observations in the corresponding regression 
samples; the full model estimations are displayed in the Appendix (Table A1, columns 2 – 5). 
The constant in the regressions is in most cases around 8 SWB points (not reported), and the 
adjusted R
2 ranges between 0.2 and 0.25, depending on the model specification.
16  
 
Table 2: Relations between happiness and fairness perceptions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Hard work brings success in the long run  0.224***       
number of observations  60730       
         
People are poor due to laziness     0.570***     
number of observations    62920     
         
People have chance to escape poverty      0.483***   
number of observations      59383   
         
Conservative ideology        0.411*** 
number of observations        146752 
         
Income, education, occupational status  no  no  no  No 
Other micro controls included  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects included  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the  baseline  micro-variables,  wave,  cohort  and  country  effects  (not  reported).  Income,  education  and 




First,  note  the  positive  signs  of  the  perceived-fairness  estimates,  indicating  that 
persons with strong fairness perceptions (a high  ˜   i) are indeed happier compared to those 
who have a different view. As all four fairness estimates are significant at the 1 percent level, 
the results are clearly in line with Proposition 1. The quantitative impact of these variables is 
considerable,  with  coefficients  ranging  between  0.22  (hard  work)  and  0.57  (laziness). 
                                                 
16 The constant can be interpreted as the baseline SWB level of the reference group, which, in this specification, 
has low  fairness perceptions, is male, has no children, is religious but not affiliated to a major religion, is 
divorced or separated from her partner, does not believe in a superior being, and never attends religious service.    26   
Comparing these effects with those of other determinants of subjective well-being as reported 
in the Appendix (Tables A1 and A2) shows that these effects are comparable with, e.g., taking 
part  in  religious  service  once  a  month  as  compared  to  never  (0.22)  or  being  married  as 
compared to being divorced or separated (0.53). According to Table A2 in the Appendix, the 
largest associations of about half a life satisfaction category are observable for labor market 
mobility perceptions (‘people are poor due to laziness’ and ‘people have a chance to escape 
poverty’)  and  ‘conservative  ideology’.  Further  investigation  shows  that  these  relative 
differences across fairness perception coefficients are not caused by changes in sample sizes 
across  regressions  (not  reported).  In  summary,  our  empirical  results  are  in  line  with 
Proposition 1, suggesting that persons who perceive the income generation process as fair 
experience higher levels of subjective well-being. 
 
Table 3: Relations between happiness and fairness perceptions – testing the transmission 
channels 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
hard work brings success in the long run  0.212***       
number of observations  60730       
         
people are poor due to laziness    0.501***     
number of observations    62920     
         
people have chance to escape poverty      0.433***   
number of observations      59383   
         
conservative ideology        0.363*** 
number of observations        146752 
         
Income, education, occupational status  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Baseline micro controls included  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country fixed effects included  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the  baseline  micro-variables,  wave,  cohort  and  country  effects  (not  reported).  Income,  education  and 
occupational status are included. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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According to the theoretical model above, perceived social mobility should have a 
positive  impact  on  individual  human  capital  investments,  expected  life-time  earnings  and 
occupational status in equilibrium, with perceived social mobility affecting subjective well-
being  through  these  transmission  channels.  As  our  next  step,  we  therefore  test  the  same 
empirical  model  specification  including  measures  of  education,  income,  and  occupational 
status. Table 3 reports the results and shows analogously to Table 2 that persons who perceive 
themselves as living in a fair society experience higher levels of subjective well-being. In line 
with  our  model,  persons  with  higher  income  or  better  education  are  happier  (for  full 
estimation  results,  again  see  Appendix  Table  A2).  Comparing  the  fairness  perception 
estimates across models (Tables 2 and 3), we observe for all four fairness perception measures 
smaller  coefficient  sizes  in  Table  3,  with  all  differences  statistically  significant  at  the  1 
percent level. For example, the coefficient on ‘people have the chance to escape poverty’ is 
0.483 in Table 2, but only 0.433 in Table 3. Thus, the SWB effects of fairness and social 
mobility perceptions are partly mediated through own human capital investment. This finding 
is again in line with the theoretical model.  
 
 
4.3. Testing Proposition 2: Fairness perception, demand for redistribution, and subjective 
well-being 
Table 4 tests the prediction of Proposition 2 that persons who perceive the income generating 
process as fair are less favorable towards equalizing the income distribution, most probably 
through  redistribution  from  the  rich  to the  poor.  We  estimate  probit  models  for  the  four 
fairness perception variables employed in the happiness models (Proposition 1) with three 
dichotomous  proxies  of  preference  for  income  redistribution  as  dependent  variables 
(preference for ‘a more equal income distribution’, for ‘eliminating income inequality’, and 
for ‘guaranteeing basic needs’, respectively). Due to missing observations in regressors and 
regressants, not all 12 possible models could be estimated. For the larger samples, we observe 
values  of  Pseudo  R
2  between  0.05  and  0.08,  a  reasonable  size  for  comparable  probit   28   
estimations. Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates, its level of significance and the number 
of observations in the regression sample.  
 
Table 4: Fairness perceptions and the demand for income redistribution  
 












hard work brings success in the long run  0.097***     
  [8.44]     
marginal effect  0.035     
number of observations  59325     
Pseudo R2  0.0521 
     
people are poor due to laziness, not injustice  -0.230***  -0.311***  -0.249*** 
  [20.79]  [18.83]  [10.92] 
marginal effect  -0.082  -0.110  -0.034 
number of observations  74588  28814  29114 






people have chance to escape poverty  -0.147***     
  [11.95]     
marginal effect  -0.052     
number of observations  57822     
Pseudo R2  0.0505 
     
conservative ideology  -0.217***  -0.360***  -0.224*** 
  [23.68]  [19.69]  [9.43] 
marginal effect  -0.075  -0.134  -0.034 
number of observations  128917  34193  34610 






       
Country fixed effects included  yes  yes  yes 
Income, education, occupational status  no  no  no 
Baseline micro controls included  yes  yes  yes 
Notes: Probit estimations. Dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of preference for income redistribution. 
All models include other micro controls such as gender, age, family type, marital status, religion, religiosity, 
spirituality, cohort effects, country fixed effects and a wave dummy. Excluded from the model are measures of 
education, income, and occupational status. Missing regressions are due to insufficient sample sizes. *, **, *** 
denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Almost  all  regressions  in  Table  4  suggest  that  people  who  perceive  the  income 
generating process as fair are less in favor of redistribution through the government. This is 
observable  for  the  measures  ‘poverty  due  to  laziness’,  ‘chance  to  escape  poverty’  and 
‘conservative ideology’. Notably, these individual ideology and perceived fairness effects are, 
given that we employ country  fixed effects,  independent of  'national'  beliefs  and political 
cultures. The marginal effects suggest that the effect of fairness perceptions decreases the 
probability  of  demanding  government  activities  by  between  3  and  13  percent.  Thus,  the 
results  are  in  line  with  Proposition  2,  suggesting  that  persons  who  believe  in  procedural 
fairness oppose government redistribution. 
Somewhat  astonishing  is  the  increase  in  the  probability  of  favoring  a  more  equal 
income distribution expressed by persons who believe that ‘hard work brings success in the 
long run’, possibly reflecting a modern version of Weber’s hypothesis of a Protestant work 
ethic.
17 Arguably, ‘having success’ is multidimensional, whereas ‘escaping poverty’ is one-
dimensionally related to gaining income only. However, as this variable can only be included 
in model 1, we cannot draw a clear conclusion whether the positive sign is a statistical artifact 
or indicates a generic relation.  
Overall, the results in Table 4 support the prediction of Proposition 2 that perceived 
social mobility reduces the demand for income redistribution from the rich to the poor. 
 
Table  5  tests the  second  part of Proposition  2,  which  predicts  a  negative  relation 
between a preference for redistribution and individual welfare. This prediction translates into 
our empirical model based on the WVS that persons with a preference for ‘a more equal 
income distribution’, for ‘eliminating income inequality’, or for ‘guaranteeing basic needs’ 
(see Table 4) should report lower levels of subjective well-being. All three columns show 
that,  indeed,  persons  who  demand  a  more  equal  income  distribution  (potentially  through 
government intervention) and guaranteed basic needs for everybody, are less satisfied with 
their lives compared to those with no such preferences. With coefficient estimates between 
                                                 
17 In the traditional Calvinist view and according to their predestination theory, only the efforts of the ’blessed’ 
would yield economic success, in contrast to that by the ’lost souls’. Thus, economic success in ‘this world’ is 
perceived by Calvinists as a signal for being chosen to have a good afterlife.    30   
-0.2 and -0.38, the quantitative effect on subjective well-being is of medium size, comparable 
to that of 'cohabiting' as opposed to being 'divorced or separated'. 
Overall, Tables 4 and 5 present evidence in line with Proposition 2: We find that those 
persons who perceive the society they live in as fair are less likely to demand a more equal 
(post-tax and -transfer)  income distribution.  Furthermore, we also  find that those who do 
demand more equal incomes report lower levels of life satisfaction. 
 
Table 5: Subjective well-being and the demand for redistribution 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Importance to eliminate income inequality  -0.338***     
  [6.40]     
Incomes should be more equal    -0.380***   
    [26.86]   
Importance to guaranteeing basic needs      -0.177*** 
      [4.19] 
       
baseline micro controls included  yes  yes  yes 
income, education, occupational status  no  no  no 
country fixed effects included  yes  yes  yes 
       
number of observations  34193  128917  34610 
Adjusted R-squared  0.24  0.22  0.24 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the model are 
measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 




4.4. Proposition 3: Inequality and fairness perceptions 
Proposition 3 relates fairness perceptions, actual fairness in society and income inequality to 
well-being. We test Proposition 3 by interacting the individual fairness perception variables 
with the Gini coefficient, and splitting the regression samples by actual social mobility at the 
country  level,  as  reflected  by  a  country’s  economic  and  political  institutions  that  govern 
people’s economic activities. Our theoretical model predicts that in the low social mobility 
sample,  we  should  observe  a  negative  interaction  between  perceived  fairness  and  income 
inequality.  For countries with  high upward  mobility, we theoretically predict the negative   31   
interaction to become weaker and ultimately, to disappear: With actual fairness () tending 
towards unity, negative surprises with regard to income, and thus unexpected tax increases, 
become smaller and ultimately disappear.  
 
Table 6: Analysis by low social mobility through little economic opportunities  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 
Civil liberties  
low 
Fraser  















      area 1  area 2  area 3  area 4  area 5 
               
Hard work * GINI  -0.001  -0.005**  -0.007  -0.002  -0.004*  -0.004  -0.003 
  [0.33]  [2.03]  [0.88]  [0.70]  [1.73]  [1.46]  [0.79] 
Hardwork  0.221*  0.424***  0.493**  0.290***  0.403***  0.361***  0.348*** 
  [1.72]  [4.26]  [2.18]  [2.61]  [4.26]  [3.49]  [2.98] 
Observations  28613  28037  20722  29630  33111  27768  22566 
               
Chance * GINI  -0.004  -0.016***  0.015*  -0.017***  -0.015***  -0.015***  -0.014*** 
  [1.44]  [7.13]  [1.77]  [6.66]  [6.83]  [6.23]  [4.71] 
Chance  0.718***  1.114***  0.142  1.144***  1.090***  1.025***  1.013*** 
  [5.73]  [11.61]  [0.56]  [10.27]  [11.58]  [9.97]  [9.14] 
Observations  30488  29914  20127  30373  34941  28540  23551 
               
Laziness * GINI  -0.009***  -0.008***  -0.007  -0.013***  -0.009***  -0.008***  -0.015*** 
  [2.91]  [3.36]  [1.08]  [5.29]  [4.01]  [3.26]  [5.46] 
Laziness  0.938***  0.900***  0.683***  1.085***  0.968***  0.839***  1.075*** 
  [7.57]  [9.66]  [3.51]  [10.80]  [10.37]  [8.78]  [10.94] 
Observations  35191  35810  36686  38145  37779  35407  36027 
               
Conservative * GINI  -0.008***  -0.010***  -0.012***  -0.010***  -0.011***  -0.010***  -0.016*** 
  [2.99]  [4.77]  [2.87]  [4.75]  [4.98]  [5.04]  [7.45] 
Conservative  0.732***  0.871***  0.792***  0.867***  0.911***  0.840***  1.033*** 
  [6.83]  [10.15]  [6.12]  [9.55]  [10.01]  [9.94]  [12.09] 
Observations  67018  62055  47160  73857  57237  70405  65921 
               
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the models are 
measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. 
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Tables 6 and 7 present the estimates for perceived fairness and its interaction with 
income inequality, the two main variables of interest, in subsamples split by measures of civil 
liberties  and  economic  opportunities.
18  The  measures  we  use  to  proxy  for  actual  social 
mobility are the Gastil index of civil liberties and the Fraser index of economic freedom. 
Subindices  of  the  full  Fraser  index  cover  aspects  of  government  size,  legal  quality  and 
protection of property rights, inflation and the domestic financial market, trade openness and 
access to foreign capital, and labor market regulation and other market rigidities that might 
hamper entrepreneurial activities. In particular, column 1 employs the Gastil index of civil 
liberties, while column 2 reports the results for the Full Fraser index. The remaining columns 
employ subindices of the Fraser index that relate to the five specific areas described above.
19  
In the focus of our analysis are the interaction terms between income inequality and 
perceived fairness. In line with Proposition 3, in the sample of countries with low economic 
opportunities  and  rigid  institutions  (Table  6)  we  observe  the  expected  negative  effect,  as 
indicated by the negative  interaction between GINI and the four fairness perception measures 
(in most cases significant at the ten percent level at least). Given that the GINI coefficient 
varies between 20 and 60 in the sample, the overall effect of fairness perception remains 
positive, but is reduced in size as income inequality increases.  
In Table 7, we report the results for the high social mobility countries. It turns out that 
most coefficients are either statistically insignificant or negatively signed. The former would 
be in line with our prediction for countries with near-utopian levels of actual fairness, while 
the  latter  suggests  that  even  countries  with  high  values  in  the  measures  of  economic 
opportunities are still at a distance from the more utopian  1. However, the size of negative 
effects is reliably and robustly smaller in high-fairness countries, which is very strongly in 
line  with  our  proposition  3,  which  predicted  a  weakening  of  the  negative  interaction. 
Supporting the findings of Table 2, in both Tables 6 and 7 there is a positive association 
between perceived fairness and the level of subjective well-being in most of the models.  
                                                 
18 The complete model also includes the other micro control variables, country fixed effects, and wave and 
cohort effects, with results similar to those reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
19 For countries with high social mobility (Table 7), there is an insufficient number of observations for the 
subindices areas 1 and 2, so we cannot estimate these models.   33   
Proposition 3 lets us expect a weakening of the negative interaction between fairness 
perceptions and income inequality as actual social mobility in the countries increases, up to an 
insignificant interaction in high mobility countries; the heterogeneous coefficient estimates in 
Table 7 are thus consistent with our prediction. This finding is in line with Alesina et al. 
(2004) who reported an insignificant impact of income inequality on people’s happiness in 
socially very mobile U.S. states, but a negative one in less mobile European countries.  
 
Table 7: Analysis by high social mobility through good economic opportunities  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Civil liberties  
high 
Fraser  






new business  
easy 
      area 3  area 4  area 5 
           
Hard work * GINI  -0.005**  0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.005* 
  [2.03]  [0.21]  [0.33]  [0.17]  [1.74] 
Hardwork  0.438***  0.253**  0.22  0.315***  0.436*** 
  [4.98]  [1.98]  [1.57]  [2.60]  [3.82] 
Observations  31355  21319  16245  21588  26790 
           
Chance * GINI  -0.013***  0.007**  0.005  0  -0.006** 
  [5.78]  [2.03]  [1.15]  [0.07]  [2.10] 
Chance  0.929***  0.097  0.165  0.486***  0.620*** 
  [9.77]  [0.64]  [1.00]  [3.60]  [4.90] 
Observations  28161  18535  13508  19909  24898 
           
Laziness * GINI  -0.002  -0.002  -0.007**  -0.004  0.011*** 
  [0.80]  [0.71]  [2.38]  [1.24]  [4.84] 
Laziness  0.508***  0.407***  0.573***  0.515***  -0.03 
  [7.04]  [4.37]  [5.54]  [5.31]  [0.34] 
Observations  49436  38220  36251  38623  38003 
           
Conservative * GINI  -0.004**  -0.004*  -0.004**  -0.002  0.004** 
  [2.32]  [1.86]  [2.12]  [0.87]  [2.00] 
Conservative  0.527***  0.454***  0.468***  0.440***  0.218*** 
  [8.20]  [5.84]  [6.13]  [5.21]  [2.82] 
Observations  78967  68787  73605  60437  64921 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the model are 
measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. For area 1 and 2, the number of observations was too low.  
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4.5 Robustness tests using actual social mobility measures 
The model in Tables 6 – 7 and the empirical corroboration of Proposition 3 hinges on the 
assumption  that  social  mobility,  economic  opportunities  and  economic  freedom  are 
sufficiently correlated. As additional robustness test, we replicate the analyses using direct 
measures  of  educational  mobility.  These  direct  measures  are  available  for  some  OECD 
countries only, implying the disadvantage that they substantially reduce the sample size.  
Table 8 estimates the same model as in Tables 6 and 7 for two country samples split 
by the degree of intergenerational educational mobility. We employ our measure of actual 
educational mobility, defined as the educational advantage enjoyed by a person from a high-
education family (maternal or paternal education), which is available for a maximum of 27 
OECD countries in our baseline sample. The sample is split at -22 and -27 test score points, 
respectively. Again, we report only those regression results for which at least 10 countries 
remain in each of the subsamples, resulting in two fairness perception measures (‘laziness’ 
and  ‘conservative’).  Columns  1  and  2  present  the  low  educational  mobility  findings, 
differentiated by either paternal or maternal family background (correlation coefficient: rho = 
0.94); columns 3 and 4 display analogous regressions for countries with a high degree of 
social mobility.  
For all fairness perception measures, in low mobility countries the negative effect of 
inequality for individuals with high fairness perceptions is clearly observable. Equally in line 
with Proposition 3, in the  high  mobility  country sample we observe  insignificant or only 
weakly  significant  interactions  of  inequality  for  the  parents'  educational  background.  The 
positive sign of both coefficients can be interpreted as an indication that individuals who have 
experienced upward social mobility in their family experience – and believe this to be the 
result of fair institutions – experience an adverse impact of income redistribution on their 
well-being. Again, we achieve corroborating results for those fairness perception measures 
that are similar to those employed in previous empirical studies discussed above (e.g., Corneo 
and Gruener, 2002, Alesina and LaFerrara, 2005).    35   
Overall, the robustness test using educational mobility measures in Table 8 is well in 
line  with  Proposition  3,  with  a  negative  interaction  in  low  mobility  countries,  and 
heterogeneous effects in the high mobility country sample.
20  
 
Table 8: Educational mobility, fairness perceptions and income inequality 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Low mobility  Low mobility  High mobility  High mobility 
  father  mother  father  mother 
Laziness   1.084***  1.131***  0.024  0.001 
  [7.72]  [7.73]  [0.14]  [0.01] 
Laziness * GINI  -0.022***  -0.023***  0.007  0.008* 
  [5.15]  [5.21]  [1.49]  [1.75] 
Number of observations  22903  19951  13248  16200 
Number of countries  14  13  10  11 
         
Conservative   0.734***  0.833***  0.083  0.008 
  [5.58]  [6.08]  [0.61]  [0.07] 
Conservative * GINI  -0.009**  -0.011***  0.004  0.006* 
  [2.37]  [2.89]  [1.12]  [1.73] 
Number of observations  34835  30812  20180  24203 
Number of countries  14  13  12  13 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the model are 
measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. 
 
 
To summarize, the empirical analysis clearly is in line with our theoretical hypotheses. 
Individuals who perceive their society as unfair are less likely to be satisfied with their lives 
(Proposition  1),  and  are  more  likely  to  oppose  redistributive  government  activities 
(Proposition 2). In low mobility countries, people fare the better, the more redistribution takes 
                                                 
20 In our view, it is not a coincidence that the process of industrialization and period of high growth in Europe 
and  the  United  States  (from  1790  on)  was  preceded  by  political reforms  which abolished  the  competition-
hindering and  incentive-incompatible  medieval  guild  system,  which  fixed  production  technology,  prices  for 
goods and wages for employees, and choice of profession. It is for this reason that we view GDP growth as a 
potential alternative measure of actual social mobility (correlation (GDP growth, social mobility): 0.4), in line 
with Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) who argue that in times of rapid economic growth income inequality is 
interpreted as higher opportunities. Regressions for country samples split by economic growth yield qualitatively 
identical findings compared to when more direct measures of social mobility are employed (see Appendix Table 
A3).    36   
place,  reflected  in  reduced  income  inequality.  This  effect  is  enlarged  by  lower  mobility 
perceptions: The positive effect of living in a fair society on well-being decreases as income 
inequality rises. In contrast, in high mobility countries, we observe that people are more ready 
to bear existing income inequalities and disfavor redistribution. Increasing perceived fairness 
of the income generation process does not alter the well-being effects of income inequality 
any more (Proposition 3). Because these findings provide an important qualification to some 




5. Conclusions   
The empirical literature on the relation between income inequality and happiness has yielded 
ambiguous results. The starting point of this paper was that one of the potential reasons for 
this confusion might be that people evaluate the fairness of the income distribution (i.e., the 
distribution generation process) differently  and that such subjective evaluations eventually 
affect their subjective well-being. Extending the previous literature, we also make the case 
that inequality assessments hinge on whether social mobility expectations meet actual societal 
mobility or not. 
We illustrate the relationship between inequality and subjective well-being in a small 
formal model where individual effort and labor market participation depends on subjectively 
perceived probabilities of success that, in turn, reflect fairness perceptions: The higher the 
probability of success, the closer is the individually perceived connection between individual 
effort and economic outcomes. We therefore in general expect a positive relationship between 
perceived  fairness  and  overall  well-being,  and  a  negative  effect  on  the  preference  for 
government redistribution. If ex ante fairness perceptions are sufficiently low, the individual 
will choose an investment level of zero, and benefit from a reduction of income inequality 
through  taxes  and  transfers.  We  also  distinguish  between  the  effects  of  over-  and 
underestimation of the actual fairness of the income generating process. Low or high actual 
fairness is associated with low or high upward mobility, respectively. We argue that in low   37   
mobility countries, actual individual returns to effort are often lower than expected ones. This 
leads to an unexpected increase of the budget-balancing tax burden, and thus to a negative 
interaction between fairness perception and inequality for individuals who participate in the 
labor  market.  In  contrast,  for  high  mobility  countries,  the  model  predicts  an  insignificant 
coefficient for the interaction of fairness with inequality.  
We test this model using combined individual-level data of the pooled third and fourth 
waves  of  the  World  Values  Survey  (1994-2001),  containing  about  150’000  interviewed 
individuals in 69 countries. According to the results, the respondents’ believe that income 
inequality  in  society  is  the  result  of  a  comparably  fair  market  process  makes  them 
considerably  more  satisfied  with  their  lives,  while  a  demand  for  more  government 
redistribution  for  correcting  the  market-income  distribution  is  negatively  associated  with 
happiness.  However,  differentiating  by  level  of  actual  social  mobility  in  a  country,  in 
countries  with  fewer  economic  opportunities  we  find  evidence  for  a  negative  effect  of 
inequality for individuals with high fairness perceptions. In contrast, in countries with plenty 
of economic opportunities and equal chances to success, the negative effect is either smaller 
or disappears, depending on the measure used.  
The findings obviously qualify the standard Lerner argument that more redistribution 
and less income inequality leads to an increase in welfare of the average person, and thus, in 
average welfare. Instead, the model and the empirical analysis suggest that for broad groups 
of countries the potential effects of inequality depend on the interplay between perceived and 
actual fairness of the institutional framework. The overall effect of inequality on subjective 
well-being is thus much more ambiguous at the aggregate level of society than predicted by 
many standard models. As such, our findings may hold implications for both policy and future 
theorizing on the subject. Obviously, in terms of happiness there may be a substitutive effect 
between developing institutions permitting fair market competition and social mobility, on the 
one hand, and redistributive government activities, on the other: The latter are only essential if 
actual social mobility is low but fairness perceptions are high. As human beings tend to be 
overly optimistic in general, it would seem to be beneficial to overall welfare to implement 
policies  and  institutions  that  foster  competition  and  allow  for  equal  opportunities  and   38   
economic freedom. This finding is quite in line with the definition of a just society often 
brought forward by politically conservative persons, but also congruent with Hayek’s view of 
a just world. Overall, our results suggest that creating a society with such equal opportunities 
would be preferred over a paternalistic and overly redistributive state.  














   39   
References 
Alesina, A., R. DiTella and R. MacCulloch, 2004, Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans 
and Americans Different? Journal of Public Economics 88: 2009-2042. 
Alesina,  A.  and  E.  La  Ferrara,  2005,  Preferences  for  redistribution  in  the  land  of 
opportunities, Journal of Public Economics 89: 897-931. 
Bergh, A., 2005, On the Counterfactual Problem of Welfare State Research: How Can We 
Measure Redistribution? European Sociological Review 21, 4: 345-357. 
Bjørnskov,  C.,  A.  Dreher  and  J.A.V.  Fischer,  2008,  Cross-country  determinants  of  life 
satisfaction: Exploring different determinants across groups in society, Social Choice 
and Welfare 30: 119-173. 
Blanchflower, D.G. and A.J. Oswald, 2004, Well-Being Over Time in Britain and the USA, 
Journal of Public Economics 88: 1359-1386. 
Clark, A.E., P. Frijters and M. Shields, 2008, Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An 
Explanation for the Easterlin and Other Puzzles, Journal of Economic Literature 46: 
95-144.  
Clark,  A.  and  E.  D’Angelo,  2008,  Upward  Social  Mobility,  Wellbeing  and  Political 
Preferences: Evidence from the BHPS, working paper, Paris School of Economics, 17 
October 2008.  
Corneo,  G.  and  H.P.  Gruener,  2002,  Individual  preferences  for  political  redistribution, 
Journal of Public Economics 83: 83-107.  
Diener, E., R.E. Lucas, U. Schimmack and J. Helliwell, 2008, Well-Being for Public Policy, 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Dohmen, Th., A. Falk, D. Huffman, F. Marklein and U. Sunde, 2009, Biased Probability 
Judgment: Evidence of Incidence and  Relationship to Economic Outcomes  from  a 
Representative Sample, Journal of Behavioral Organization, forthcoming. 
Fehr,  E.  and  K.M.  Schmidt,  1999,  A  theory  of  fairness,  competition,  and  cooperation, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 817-868.  
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. and P. Frijters, 2004, How Important is Methodology for the Estimates 
of the Determinants of Happiness? The Economic Journal 114: 641–659.    40   
Fischer,  J.A.V.,  2009a.  Subjective  Well-Being  as  Welfare  Measure:  Concepts  and 
Methodology, MPRA Paper 16619, University Library of Munich, Germany. 
Fischer, J.A.V., 2009b, The Welfare Effects of Social Mobility, OECD Social, Employment 
and Migration Working Papers 93, OECD, Directorate for Employment, Labour and 
Social Affairs. 
Fischer, J.A.V., 2009c, Happiness and Age Cycles – Return to Start...?: On the Functional 
Relationship between Subjective Well-being and Age, OECD Social, Employment and 
Migration  Working  Papers  99,  OECD,  Directorate  for  Employment,  Labour  and 
Social Affairs. 
Freedom House, 2007, Freedom in the World Country Ratings. 
Frey,  B.  and  A.  Stutzer,  2005,  Beyond  outcomes:  measuring  procedural  utility,  Oxford 
Economic Papers 57: 90-111. 
Grosfeld I. and C. Senik, 2009, The emerging aversion to inequality - Evidence from long 
subjective data, PSE Working Papers 2008-19, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). 
Gwartney, J. and R. Lawson, 2008, Economic Freedom of the World: 2008 Annual Report. 
Hayek, F.A., 1944, The Road to Serfdom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hopkins,  E.,  2008,  Inequality,  Happiness  and  Relative  Concerns:  What  Actually  is  their 
Relationship? Journal of Economic Inequality 6: 351-372. 
Hirschman, A. and M. Rothschild, 1973, The changing tolerance for income inequality in the 
course of economic development, Quarterly Journal of Economics 87: 544-566. 
Inglehart, R., M. Basañez, J. Díez-Medrano, L. Halman and R. Luijkx, 2004, Human Beliefs 
and Values, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Layard, R., G. Mayraz and S. Nickell, 2009, Does Relative Income Matter ? Are the Critics 
Right? CEP Discussion Paper No 918, March 2009. 
Lerner, A., 1944, The economics of control: principles of  welfare economics, New York: 
MacMillan. 
Mitchell, G., P.E. Tetlock, B.A. Mellers and L.D. Ordóñez, 1993, Judgments of social justice: 
compromises  between  equality  and  efficiency,  Journal  of  Personality  and  Social 
Psychology 65: 629-639.   41   
Piketty, T., 1995, Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
110: 551-584. 
Ravillion, M. and M. Lokshin, 2000, Who wants to redistribute? The tunnel effect in 1990s 
Russia, Journal of Public Economics 76: 87-104. 
Roemer, J.E., 1998, Theories of distributive justice, Harvard University Press: 1998. 
Scott,  J.T.,  R.E.  Matland,  P.A.  Michelbach  and  B.H.  Bornstein,  2001,  Just  deserts:  an 
experimental  study  of  distributive  justice  norms,  American  Journal  of  Political 
Science 45: 74-767. 
Stutzer, A., and B.S. Frey, 2003, Institutions Matter for Procedural Utility:  An Economic 
Study  of  the  Impact  of  Political  Participation  Possibilities,  in:  R.  Mudambi  et  al. 
(eds.),  Economic  Welfare,  International  Business  and  Global Institutional  Change, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 81-99. 
UNU, 2006, World income inequality database v2.0. Helsinki: United Nations University-
World Institute for Development Economics Research. 
Veblen, T., 1899, The Theory of the Leisure Class, New York: MacMillan. 
Veenhoven, R., 2000, The four qualities of life: Ordering concepts and measures of the good 
















To keep the CESifo working paper as short as possible, Appendix tables have been deleted 
from the manuscript. They can be found in the identical online-version version of the paper 
(MPRA Paper 25826) downloadable from http://ideas.repec.org or http://mpra.repec.org.   CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3152 Lorenzo C. G. Pozzi, Casper G. de Vries and Jorn Zenhorst, World Equity Premium 
Based Risk Aversion Estimates, August 2010 
 
3153 Volker Grossmann, Thomas M. Steger and Timo Trimborn, Dynamically Optimal R&D 
Subsidization, August 2010 
 
3154 Alexander Haupt, Tim Krieger and Thomas Lange, A Note on Brain Gain and Brain 
Drain: Permanent Migration and Education Policy, August 2010 
 
3155 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, Long-run Determinants of Sovereign Yields, 
August 2010 
 
3156 Franziska Tausch, Jan Potters and Arno Riedl, Preferences for Redistribution and 
Pensions. What can we Learn from Experiments?, August 2010 
 
3157 Martin Kolmar and Andreas Wagener, Inefficient Group Organization as Optimal 
Adaption to Dominant Environments, August 2010 
 
3158 Kai Carstensen, Klaus Wohlrabe and Christina Ziegler, Predictive Ability of Business 
Cycle Indicators under Test: A Case Study for the Euro Area Industrial Production, 
August 2010 
 
3159 Horst Rottmann and Timo Wollmershäuser, A Micro Data Approach to the 
Identification of Credit Crunches, August 2010 
 
3160 Philip E. Graves, Appropriate Fiscal Policy over the Business Cycle: Proper Stimulus 
Policies Can Work, August 2010 
 
3161 Michael Binder and Marcel Bluhm, On the Conditional Effects of IMF Program 
Participation on Output Growth, August 2010 
 
3162 Michael Binder, Qianying Chen, and Xuan Zhang, On the Effects of Monetary Policy 
Shocks on Exchange Rates, August 2010 
 
3163 Felix J. Bierbrauer, On the Optimality of Optimal Income Taxation, August 2010 
 
3164 Nikolaus Wolf, Europe’s Great Depression – Coordination Failure after the First World 
War, September 2010 
 
3165 Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields, September 
2010 
 
3166 Jean-Pierre Ponssard and Catherine Thomas, Capacity Investment under Demand 
Uncertainty. An Empirical Study of the US Cement Industry, 1994-2006, September 
2010  
3167 Jørgen Juel Andersen, Jon H. Fiva and Gisle James Natvik, Voting when the Stakes are 
High, September 2010 
 
3168 Michael Hoel, Is there a Green Paradox?, September 2010 
 
3169 Scott Alan Carson, Nineteenth Century US African-American and White Female 
Statures: Insight from US Prison Records, September 2010 
 
3170 Gil S. Epstein, Yosef Mealem and Shmuel Nitzan, Political Culture and Discrimination 
in Contests, September 2010 
 
3171 Sara Fisher Ellison, Jeffrey Greenbaum and Wallace P. Mullin, Diversity, Social Goods 
Provision, and Performance in the Firm, September 2010 
 
3172 Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, Randolph Sloof and Ferdinand von Siemens, Monitoring 
your Friends, not your Foes: Strategic Ignorance and the Delegation of Real Authority, 
September 2010 
 
3173 Marcus Dittrich and Beate Schirwitz, Union Membership and Employment Dynamics: 
A Note, September 2010 
 
3174 Francesco Daveri, Paolo Manasse and Danila Serra, The Twin Effects of Globalization 
– Evidence from a Sample of Indian Manufacturing Firms, September 2010 
 
3175 Florian Blöchl, Fabian J. Theis, Fernando Vega-Redondo and Eric O’N. Fisher, Which 
Sectors of a Modern Economy are most Central?, September 2010 
 
3176 Dag Morten Dalen, Marilena Locatelli and Steinar Strøm, Longitudinal Analysis of 
Generic Substitution, September 2010 
 
3177 Armin Falk, Stephan Meier and Christian Zehnder, Did we Overestimate the Role of 
Social Preferences? The Case of Self-Selected Student Samples, September 2010 
 
3178 Christian Fahrholz and Cezary Wójcik, The Bail-Out! Positive Political Economics of 
Greek-type Crises in the EMU, September 2010 
 
3179 Klaus Abberger and Wolfgang Nierhaus, The Ifo Business Cycle Clock: Circular 
Correlation with the Real GDP, September 2010 
 
3180 Walter Krämer and Gerhard Arminger, “True Believers” or Numerical Terrorism at the 
Nuclear Power Plant, September 2010 
 
3181 Bernard M.S. Van Praag, Dmitri Romanov and Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Happiness and 
Financial Satisfaction in Israel. Effects of Religiosity, Ethnicity, and War, September 
2010 
 
3182 Dimitrios Koumparoulis and Paul De Grauwe, Public Capital, Employment and 
Productivity: An Empirical Investigation for Greece, September 2010 
 
  
3183 John Whalley and Tanmaya Shekhar, The Rapidly Deepening India-China Economic 
Relationship, September 2010 
 
3184 Andreas Schäfer and Thomas Steger, History, Expectations, and Public Policy: 
Economic Development in Eastern Germany, September 2010 
 
3185 Thomas Eichner and Marco Runkel, Subsidizing Renewable Energy under Capital 
Mobility, September 2010 
 
3186 Konstantinos Angelopoulos and James Malley, Fear of Model Misspecification and the 
Robustness Premium, September 2010 
 
3187 Philip E. Graves, A Note on the Design of Experiments Involving Public Goods, 
September 2010 
 
3188 Glenn Ellison, How does the Market Use Citation Data? The Hirsch Index in 
Economics, September 2010 
 
3189 Barbara Hanel and Regina T. Riphahn, The Employment of Mothers – Recent 
Developments and their Determinants in East and West Germany, September 2010 
 
3190 Alexander Haupt and Silke Uebelmesser, Integration, Mobility, and Human Capital 
Formation, September 2010 
 
3191 Vincenzo Galasso and Paola Profeta, When the State Mirrors the Family: The Design of 
Pension Systems, September 2010 
 
3192 Stéphane Zuber and Geir B. Asheim, Justifying Social Discounting: The Rank-
Discounted Utilitarian Approach, September 2010 
 
3193 Alexander Kemnitz, Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees, 
September 2010 
 
3194 Claudia M. Buch, Sandra Eickmeier and Esteban Prieto, Macroeconomic Factors and 
Micro-Level Bank Risk, September 2010 
 
3195 May Elsayyad and Kai A. Konrad, Fighting Multiple Tax Havens, September 2010 
 
3196 Laszlo Goerke and Markus Pannenberg, Trade Union Membership and Dismissals, 
September 2010 
 
3197 Ferdinand Mittermaier and Johannes Rincke, Do Countries Compensate Firms for 
International Wage Differentials?, September 2010 
 
3198 John Boyd, Gianni De Nicoló and Abu M. Jalal, Bank Competition, Asset Allocations 
and Risk of Failure: An Empirical Investigation, September 2010 
 
3199 Guido Heineck and Bernd Süssmuth, A Different Look at Lenin’s Legacy: Trust, Risk, 
Fairness and Cooperativeness in the two Germanies, September 2010 
  
3200 Ingvild Almås, Tarjei Havnes and Magne Mogstad, Baby Booming Inequality? 
Demographic Change and Earnings Inequality in Norway, 1967-2000, October 2010 
 
3201 Thomas Aronsson and Sören Blomquist, The Standard Deviation of Life-Length, 
Retirement Incentives, and Optimal Pension Design, October 2010 
 
3202 Thorvaldur Gylfason and Eduard Hochreiter, Growing Together: Croatia and Latvia, 
October 2010 
 
3203 Ken Burdett and Melvyn Coles, Tenure and Experience Effects on Wages: A Theory, 
October 2010 
 
3204 Wendy Carlin, Good Institutions are not enough: Ongoing Challenges of East German 
Development, October 2010 
 
3205 Tobias König and Andreas Wagener, Tax Structure and Government Expenditures 
under Tax Equity Norms, October 2010 
 
3206 Daniel W. Sacks, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, Subjective Well-Being, Income, 
Economic Development and Growth, October 2010 
 
3207 Mario Larch and Wolfgang Lechthaler, Why “Buy American” is a Bad Idea but 
Politicians still Like it, October 2010 
 
3208 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Luis A. Gil-Alana, US Disposable Personal Income and 
Housing Price Index: A Fractional Integration Analysis, October 2010 
 
3209 Bruno S. Frey, Withering Academia?, October 2010 
 
3210 Eva Mörk, Anna Sjögren and Helena Svaleryd, Childcare Costs and the Demand for 
Children – Evidence from a Nationwide Reform, October 2010 
 
3211 Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson and Roman M. Sheremeta, The Attack and Defense of 
Weakest-Link Networks, October 2010 
 
3212 Shmuel Nitzan and Kaoru Ueda, Prize Sharing in Collective Contests, October 2010 
 
3213 Erling Eide, Kristine von Simson and Steinar Strøm, Rank Dependent Utility, Tax 
Evasion and Labor Supply, October 2010 
 
3214 Thomas Eichner and Marco Runkel, Interjurisdictional Spillovers, Decentralized 
Policymaking and the Elasticity of Capital Supply, October 2010 
 
3215 Susan Athey and Glenn Ellison, Dynamics of Open Source Movements, October 2010 
 
3216 Christian Bjørnskov, Axel Dreher, Justina A.V. Fischer and Jan Schnellenbach, 
Inequality and Happiness: When Perceived Social Mobility and Economic Reality do 
not Match, October 2010 